HOW TO MAKE A CASE DIGEST | BEGINNER FRIENDLY GUIDE
CASE DIGEST EXAMPLE:
INTOD V. CA
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
FACTS:
CONTENT:
ARGUMENT
COUNTERARGUMENT
RULING OF MTC, RTC, AND CA
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's residence in Misamis Occidental. There, they a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told them that he wanted Palangpangan to be dead due to land disputes.
At around 10:00 PM, Intod, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig arrived in Palangpangan's house all armed with an intent to kill Palangpangan. Mandaya pointed to the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. The four, with the exception of Mandaya, fired at the said room.
Palangpangan was in another city and her room was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family who were not also present when the accused fired at the house. No one was hit nor injured.
Intod was convicted of attempted murder by the RTC and the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that his act was an impossible crime. However, the respondent argued that there was intent and the only reason the crime was not completed was because the intended victim, Palangpangan, was not at home at the time. This means the crime was possible, not impossible.
ISSUE:
THE PROBLEM THE SUPREME COURT IS TRYING TO RESOLVE.
Whether Intod is guilty of an impossible crime
Is Intod guilty of an impossible crime?
RULING:
CONTENT:
CATEGORICAL ANSWER (YES OR NO)
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
No. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor’s will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case, all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
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